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SUBJECT: FSC-PC FEBRUARY 18: DFM GRUSHKO SHEDS LITTLE LIGHT
ON EUROPEAN SECURITY TREATY:

¶1. (SBU) Summary: Offering what he said was more a "vision" than a proposal, Russian DFM Grushko told the February 18 joint meeting of the Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC) and the Permanent Council that "new realities" and mounting evidence of the weakness of existing institutions necessitated a new, genuinely collective approach to European security. Pointing to Kosovo and the "disaster" in the Caucasus, Grushko argued Europe's contemporary security framework had been undermined, and asserted NATO "centrism and exclusiveness" would prevent the rise of true partnerships. He acknowledged, however, that the OSCE could play a unique role in a new security dialogue, as instruments like the FSC were already in place, and said Russia was willing to make the OSCE the primary) but not the only) forum for discussion, as the ongoing EU-Russia Dialogue and the NATO-Russia Council could also serve as useful platforms. According to Grushko, Russia is seeking a "Helsinki Plus," or a means of affirming agreed principles in a legally binding manner and establishing a "new and improved" arms control regime.

¶2. (SBU) While stopping short of proposing the complete elimination of the human and economic dimensions of security, Grushko emphasized the importance of "hard security" concepts, and noted that while Russia agreed a comprehensive approach was necessary, the various aspects of security need not be "crammed into a single mechanism." In closing, Grushko asserted Russia's right to ensure its own security, and argued Russia could not overlook a significant military alliance's creep toward its borders. He also claimed CFE discussions had "lost any bearing" on contemporary reality and argued Russia had fulfilled its Istanbul commitments, adding the "small technical issues" of Gudauta and Kolbasa

were of little importance. Finally, Grushko welcomed the Greek Chairmanship's proposal for informal consultations and a separate high-level event, and urged the Annual Security Review Conference (ASRC) to be at the ministerial level this year, and that Russian FM Lavrov planned to attend.

¶3. (SBU) While Belarus, Serbia, and Kazakhstan warmly welcomed Russia's initiative and expressed support for a dialogue that could strengthen security in our "common space," others (the EU, the United Kingdom, Germany, Switzerland, Norway, Italy, Romania, Cyprus, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkey, Canada, and the U.S.) noted the continuing value of agreed principles and existing institutions, and emphasized their belief in an indivisible and comprehensive concept of security. Several recalled the Helsinki Final Act and called attention to the CFE Treaty, arguing these provided a useful foundation for Euro-Atlantic security and should not be tossed lightly aside.

¶4. (SBU) Many participating States, including the U.S., questioned Russia's credibility, observing it was difficult to trust Russia's expressed commitments to territorial integrity and other key concepts when it had so blatantly violated those principles. The U.S. noted the right of all States to freely choose their military alliances. All States expressed a guarded willingness to engage in open and frank dialogue within the OSCE, but only if discussions included both sides of the Atlantic. The U.S. noted the need for more concrete answers from Russia and the lack of agreement on holding the ASRC at the ministerial level. End summary.

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Merkel, Sarkozy, and Churchill

¶5. (SBU) Russian DFM Aleksandr Grushko began his presentation by contrasting Winston Churchill's 1946 Fulton, Missouri speech, which pondered whether the U.S. would be able to live up to its then new super power status, with a recent article by German Chancellor Merkel and French President Sarkozy, which asserts that "no one country can by itself solve the world's problems," to emphasize how far the security climate has changed in 60 years. Grushko said that events such as 9/11, as well as the current global economic crisis, the war on terror, establishment of peace in the Middle East and Afghanistan, proliferation of WMD, and combating global climate change left little doubt that a new perspective and new approach to principles of Euro-Atlantic collective security was needed.

Failure of Existing Security Arrangements

¶6. (SBU) Grushko conceded that Euro-Atlantic principles have been advanced over the years, but complained they had not reached their full potential. He lamented that the principles of Helsinki have not progressed beyond the cold-war mentality of "ours versus theirs." The unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo, the NATO intervention in the Balkans, and the "disaster in the Caucasus" all demonstrated the failure of contemporary current Euro-Atlantic security arrangements.

NATO Inhibits Collective Security

¶7. (SBU) Grushko pointed to security-based alliances such as NATO, among others, as the primary inhibitor of true collective security. He charged that the exclusiveness of NATO generates dividing lines that splinter Europe. Recalling NATO's reaction to the crisis in Georgia, Grushko said that in August everyone saw how impervious NATO had become to Russian appeals; how it denied Russia the inalienable right of a state to be heard. He added, "This is not a proper relationship."

18. (SBU) On more than one occasion, Grushko referred to the "desire of several states to "overhaul the Euro-Atlantic security structure." He said that his experiences at the informal luncheon at the Helsinki Ministerial in late 2008 and the Munich security conference earlier in February has led him to believe that we need fresh, novel ideas; in short, we need to "re-boot." He invited all to get down to the business of negotiating a new treaty, in line with Russian President Medvedev's proposals, that would form the basis for a qualitatively new type of cooperation, based on the principles of Helsinki, and that would make these principles legally binding. Grushko said Russia had put its own ideas forward and he hoped that those ideas would generate qualitative responses from its partners. (Comment: Since Grushko did not provide specific proposals, he was likely

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referring to an informal paper distributed previously by Ulyanov, the Russian chief arms control delegate in Vienna. End comment.)

19. (SBU) Grushko reiterated that he wanted this process to lead to a legally binding instrument that would recognize all participants as equals and that would ensure no individual state could pursue its own security at the expense of another state. The instrument would require a reassessment of arms control, provide a unitary conflict resolution mechanism, and respond to global threats. Its negotiation would also include existing organizations or alliances such as NATO, OSCE, CIS, CSTO, and the EU, not to mention Canada and the U.S.

110. (SBU) Grushko rhetorically asked "what is the added value and what is so lacking in the current system?" He said that Russia is open to discussing why the previous instruments have only been partially implemented in the past. This discussion would identify which of the current security instruments remain valid and which need to be updated. He added that clear criteria and measures in place for conflict prevention are needed and that trust must be at the heart of the dialogue.

A Comprehensive but Uncrowded Security Document

111. (SBU) Turning to the issue of comprehensive security, Grushko contended that Russia envisions a comprehensive instrument, but added that it is not important to try and "cram all elements of the three dimensions into one document." For example, there have been a lot of good decisions on the human dimension that have resulted from Helsinki. Furthermore, there are other bodies and formats that are more appropriate for the second and third dimensions, such as the Council of Europe.

112. (SBU) Grushko said no one is trying to detract from this ongoing work on the human dimension and any new treaty was not intended to slow this work. He mischievously asked if perhaps OSCE members would want to add a human dimension provision banning of the death penalty. However, he continued, gender equality, for example, does not have a direct impact on European security and would not be included. He said we need to prioritize our efforts and determine how to proceed.

Do As We Say, Not As We Do

113. (SBU) We see a problem with the hard security component. We see hard security as a way of moving beyond simple political statements. Since 1991, the Russian Federation has abided by all commitments, removing troops from Eastern

Europe, destroying 100,000 of thousands of pieces of military equipment and have abided by all of the Istanbul commitments, withdrawing our forces from Georgia in 2007. Our partners have to demonstrate a similar commitment. The Medvedev proposal was made before the August war in Georgia. Russia's reaction was, therefore, not a policy decision but a reaction to a situation. We were forced to take sides. We have said as a matter of principle no state should interfere with the

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internal disputes of another state. That the resolution can not be imposed from the out side. That was before August 7.

Alliances in General, NATO in Particular

¶14. (SBU) Later, noting NATO's approaching 60th anniversary, Grushko said Russia expected a "new strategic concept" from the Alliance that would include cyber security, energy security, and the Arctic. He claimed these issues impact Russia directly and will require discussion in several fora, including the NATO-Russian Council and the EU-Russia Strategic Dialogue. Grushko said NATO'S Bucharest communique does not reflect the contributions of non-NATO members to Euro-Atlantic security.

¶15. (SBU) Grushko insisted, in response to a U.S. question, Russia does not deny the right of states to choose alliances, but rather it asks all participating States to implement the OSCE Code of Conduct principle to consider the security requirements of others. The enlargement of alliances to Russia's borders, let alone any additional members, cannot be overlooked. The (CFE) Flank problem, Grushko added, is another example of the exclusionary, non-collective approaches that a new architecture is meant to replace.

¶16. (SBU) Grushko said any security architecture devised by Euro-Atlantic members must be implemented by all pS, organizations and alliances. Transparency will be critical for working toward the same goal. Russia favors the widest possible dialogue on these matters, including states, academics, and institutions.

¶17. (SBU) Russia does not favor "spheres of influence," but others must recognize the "special relationship" the states of the former Soviet space have with each other, which resembles those between the U.S. and the UK or between Cyprus and Greece.

Arms Control in Vienna: We'll Give You Another Chance

¶18. (SBU) Grushko claimed that the OSCE's work in the political-military dimension has been idling. He said that Russia is focused on hard security because it wants to improve the performance of the OSCE in the first dimension. He conceded that some aspects of the other dimensions could be included in a new Treaty, such as those related to new threats. However, he added that this only emphasizes the point that the widening array of threats contrasts greatly with the narrow focus and motives of organizations. New functions such as energy security and cyber security will require new instruments. But he said that these cannot be addresses unless all states in the Euro-Atlantic space are contributors. De facto selective decision making, such as the U.S. European missile defense program, will not work.

Istanbul Commitments: "Technical Issues"

¶19. (SBU) With regard to arms control, the OSCE could play a unique part. It has experience, expertise, and several existing instruments. The new agenda could even include

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strategic issues as are now discussed in Geneva. In recent years some countries have linked conventional arms control in Europe to the resolution of questions in Moldova and Georgia, holding the Adapted CFE Treaty hostage to these secondary issues. If we want to revive CFE, we will need an additional overarching set of principles. Russia regretted that so much has been sacrificed to this one-sided approach and that so much could have been accomplished since Istanbul if the Adapted CFE Treaty had entered into force in 2001-2002.

¶20. (SBU) Likewise, Grushko said, there has not been much progress on CSBMs within the OSCE, including Russian proposals on measures for rapid reaction Forces and naval Forces. Russia supports German FM Steinmeier's proposal to hold a high-level conference this spring on arms control.

¶21. (SBU) Grushko said the FSC could be used to discuss the concept of "reasonable military sufficiency." Euro-Atlantic states should discuss how an instrument could be developed. A new arrangement would provide a mechanism for the cooperation of all the international and regional organizations functioning in the Euro-Atlantic space. However, the new architecture would not supplant the CFE Treaty, the Vienna Document, or the Open Skies Treaty.

Ministers Should Discuss a New Treaty at ASRC

¶22. (SBU) Finally, Grushko noted that the Russian Federation would like to see a focused effort at the 2009 Annual Security Review Conference (March 3-4), "which this year will be at the ministerial level." He claimed Russian FM Lavrov planned to attend.

EU: Willing to Discuss, But All Must Uphold OSCE Acquis

¶23. (SBU) The European Union, represented by the Czech Republic (Pocuch), was first to respond to Grushko's statement. Pocuch reminded all of the positive spirit of the debate at the Helsinki OSCE Ministerial and that the EU supported the eight points made there by Stubbs, the Finnish Chairman-in-Office. Pocuch emphasized the EU's openness to new ideas that enhance European security in a transparent process. He believed the OSCE is the natural forum to discuss European security due to its inclusive nature and comprehensive approach. The EU believed the OSCE should focus its effort on restoring mutual confidence and trust, allowing all participating states to address their legitimate security concerns. Additionally, it was equally important to revitalize the CFE regime bringing it back into full operation as well as full implementation of the Vienna Document 1999 and the Open Skies Treaty.

¶24. (SBU) Pocuch called upon all parties to preserve and fully implement the existing arms control agreements and CSBMs, as well as to explore options for strengthening them. The EU is committed to the concept of cooperative, indivisible, and cross-dimensional security. Strict adherence to and implementation of these commitments are crucial for the sustainability of cooperative security. Pocuch reaffirmed the EU commitment to the principles outlined in the Helsinki Final Act and the Paris Charter.

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Pocuch insisted all three dimensions of the OSCE equally contribute to the maintenance of peace and stability and security and should not be prioritized. Finally, Pocuch reminded all that the EU considers the comprehensive security architecture, developed over years, based on existing organizations, shared commitments and principles should not be undermined (FSC-PC.DEL/8/09).

Georgia: "A Small, Occupied Country"

¶25. (SBU) Calling itself a "small and occupied country," Georgia (Giorgadze) immediately went on the attack against Russia. Recalling Medvedev's support for the principles of sovereignty, political independence, and those found in the UN Charter, Giorgadze wondered about the value of Russia's new treaty proposal since Russia was bound to break these principles again. He asked how a new treaty would prevent participating States from breaking it. Giorgadze raised Russian failure to abide by the September 12 cease-fire agreement, citing its failure to depart Georgian territory, and refusal to allow access to military monitoring officers. Giorgadze sarcastically stated that Russia wants a new treaty so it can break it.

Serbia: Kosovo UDI Symptom of Larger Malaise

¶26. (SBU) Serbia (Beham) supported Grushko's call for dialogue on a new European security agreement. Beham cited Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) as an example of the failure of current agreement. She opined that Kosovo's actions, which violated Serbia's sovereignty, would eventually lead other separatist groups to take similar secession actions. Beham declared that the Kosovo UDI problem should be solved through open dialogue within the rule of law.

Belarus: Let's Start to Negotiate

¶27. (SBU) Unsurprisingly, Belarus (Sychoy) stated that the current Europe security structure was eroding and voiced strong support for Russia's proposal of a new security treaty. Sychoy declared that the pol-mil aspect of security should be given priority and that discussion of a new treaty should begin immediately. Belarus supported discussion of the Russian proposal at the upcoming ASRC and holding a summit.

Kazakhstan: A/CFE Will Need to Be Adapted

¶28. (SBU) Kazakhstan (Abdrakhmanov) welcomed the Russian proposals. He complained about the lack of progress on A/CFE and the Parallel Actions Package. Abdrakhmanov reminded all that Kazakhstan had already adopted A/CFE, but since it has been so long, A/CFE now needed further "adaptation."

Allies and Others: More Questions than Answers

¶29. (SBU) Turkey (Buluc) aligned itself with the content of
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the EU statement. Buluc stated that the OSCE was the right platform for European security discussion because of its comprehensive dialogue with all parties. Turkey believed all participating states need to reaffirm their political and legal commitments. Buluc also warned against distinguishing the pol-mil dimension from the other dimensions in the OSCE. Buluc wondered how any new instrument could be better than the current agreements.

¶30. (SBU) Switzerland (Marfurt) supported having the security discussion in the OSCE. Marfurt said the North American and Central Asian countries need to be involved.

¶31. (SBU) Armenia (Hovhannisyan) agreed that the OSCE was a place for candid discussion. He opined that the current security arrangement was based on old ideas and that it needed revitalization. Hovhannisyan reminded that security of one states should be not at the expense of another states.

¶32. (SBU) Romania (Feruta) voiced its support for the EU statement. Feruta also supported the current security

agreements calling them valuable. The problem is full implementation of the current commitments. He asked Grushko what role the CFE Treaty would have in the Russian proposal.

¶33. (SBU) Canada (Gregory) wanted confirmation that the new treaty would cover from Vancouver to Vladivostok and asked for concrete details on the new proposal. Gregory emphasized the need to honor the current commitments in any future agreement. She emphasized that human rights and current commitments are not negotiable. She wanted to know how the new security proposal would integrate the three OSCE dimensions as well as the CFE Treaty.

¶34. (SBU) Norway (Vik) called for current agreements to be preserved in any new security discussion. Any new treaty should not take away from current agreements. Vik stated that until the details are worked out, there should not be a rush to schedule higher level meetings.

Italy: Serious Engagement Offered

¶35. (SBU) Italy (Varvesi) voiced its support for the EU statement by the Czech Republic. Varvesi supported an examination of Russia's proposal, but insisted that the three OSCE dimensions must be included in any new agreement. Varvesi supported CiO Greece's call for a brainstorming session on the issue.

U.S.: Our Principles Fine, but Their Implementation Wanting

¶36. (SBU) The U.S. (Scott) supported the EU statement. Scott questioned Russia's call for a legally-binding agreement when it was not abiding by the CFE Treaty. He also questioned Russia's support for principles that they were currently violating in Georgia. Scott asked Grushkov what he meant by Helsinki-Plus and whether Russia supported the principles of host nation consent, right to choose alliances, and avoiding spheres of influence. The current problem is not the lack of principles, Scott said, but rather poor implementation. He reminded Grushko that there was no agreement to hold the ASRC at the minister-level.

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UK: NATO Open to All

¶37. (SBU) In response to Grushko's accusation that NATO was an exclusive club, the UK (Cliff) countered that NATO was open to all interested countries and NATO does not support a zero-sum security approach. Cliff told Grushko that for trust to be reestablished, the problems at Kolbasna and Gudauta must be resolved. He said any new agreement must reaffirm all current agreements and values and cannot be selective. Cliff wanted to know if Russia considers the OSCE the primary venue for the new European security discussion.

Germany: New Perspectives Needed

¶38. (SBU) Germany (Horsten), recalling FM Steinmeier's statement, said a new perspective on conventional arms control including the CFE Treaty was needed. Horsten called for movement to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and claimed that the soft security issue was just as important as any other security issue.

SCOTT